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We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported
by direct sanctions and default carries only a ban from ever borrowing in financial
markets even in the presence of uninsurable risks and time-varying interest rate.
This extension of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) requires that the present value of the
endowment be finite under the most optimistic valuation. We provide examples
where this condition fails and sovereign debt is sustained by the threat of loss of
insurance opportunities upon default, despite the fact that the most pessimistic
valuation of the endowment, the natural debt limit, is finite.
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1. Introduction
The impossibility result of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) asserts that sovereign debt cannot
be supported by a country’s reputation for repayments when default carries only a ban
from ever borrowing in financial markets.1 The intuition is that, when debt cannot be
rolled over, a country can always improve upon contractual arrangements that involve
repayments (positive net transfers from the country to foreign investors) by defaulting
at a contingency associated with the maximal debt exposure. Under complete markets,
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debt is unsustainable when it is bounded by a finite present value of the sovereign’s fu-
ture endowment (the natural debt limit). This paper extends the analysis to incomplete
markets.
The argument of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) is one of arbitrage: by defaulting, the
sovereign can save upon repayments, increase current consumption, and replicate the
same consumption pattern for the future without borrowing. In the presence of unin-
surable risks, however, this arbitrage may not be feasible: even though all securities are
available after default, some insurance opportunities may not be replicable without is-
suing further debt. Hence, the sovereign may prefer to repay the debt so as to maintain
access to the opportunities of risk diversification that the asset market provides, even if
incomplete. As illustrated by examples, this implicit threat of insurance loss can sustain
sovereign debt, in contrast to the case of complete markets, when borrowing is bounded
by a finite natural debt limit. To restore the validity of Bulow and Rogoff (1989), we need
to identify conditions for replication after default.
Replication may fail because the cost of providing insurance in an averse contin-
gency may become prohibitively high when debt cannot be issued. This happens when,
for instance, assets have to be held for long phases of depreciation before insurance is
needed, whereas hedging against an unfavorable state would be feasible when debt is
permitted. The cost of providing insurance at future contingencies can be estimated as
the largest present value of needed resources, whereas borrowing can only be secured by
the smallest present value of future income, the natural debt limit.2 This cost may be in-
finite, even when the natural debt limit is finite, thus preventing insurance after default.
Such a situation has no counterpart under complete markets because when the natural
debt limit is finite, so is the cost of insurance. Replication under incomplete markets
is guaranteed if the most optimistic valuation of future endowment is finite, a property
that we refer to as high implied interest rates by analogy to Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
We show that under an additional technical assumption, this is sufficient to restore the
validity of Bulow and Rogoff (1989).
Our analysis applies to any arbitrary set of securities and, subject to high implied
interest rates, to any process of prices. Beyond the generality, the absence of further re-
strictions on prices allows us to embed our conclusions in a competitive equilibrium
framework, where the pricing kernel is, in general, time-varying and simple Markov
equilibria fail to exist (see Duffie et al. 1994).3 Allowing for any set of securities clari-
fies that the structure of the asset market plays no direct role in determining incentives
to default. Indeed, for any given asset structure, depending on prices, the condition of
high implied interest rates might hold or fail, and so do incentives to default. The extent
of insurance is larger the richer the variety of financial assets, but this equally affects the
sovereign before and after default.
2Under incomplete markets, the present value of nontradable claims is ambiguous, and asset prices only
impose bounds under no arbitrage conditions. We refer to Santos and Woodford (1997), LeRoy and Werner
(2014), and our Appendix D for these basic principles.
3In a competitive economy with collateral constraints, Gottardi and Kubler (2015) show that Markov
equilibria on a finite support do not, in general, exist with more than two individuals. Most of their analysis
also extends to the equilibria with solvency constraints as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009).
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Our time-varying pricing kernel is in line with some recent literature on sovereign
default risk, which moves away from the traditional risk-neutral pricing so as to provide
a better understanding of risk premia, the term structure of interest rates, and move-
ments along the business cycle (see Arellano 2008, Arellano and Ramanarayanan 2012,
and Hatchondo et al. 2016). Our work also delivers some methodological insights into
the construction of dynamic replicating portfolios when several securities are traded in
the market. This seems particularly relevant for disentangling the interplay between
maturity choice, hedging motives, and repayment incentives in a framework in which
the government issues bonds of several maturities, a case that requires one to handle
the payoff space generated by a set of securities (see Hatchondo and Martinez 2009,
Chatterjee and Eyigungor 2012, and Aguiar et al. 2016).
The restrictions on prices needed to prove the existence of incentives to default ob-
tain at a competitive equilibrium under some primitive conditions on fundamentals.
In particular, as proved by Santos and Woodford (1997), when the dividend accruing to
the market portfolio is at least a constant fraction of the overall endowment, the most
optimistic valuation of the aggregate endowment is necessarily finite. This case is of
considerable interest on empirical grounds, because of the work of Abel et al. (1989) on
dynamic efficiency. Furthermore, when individuals’ preferences satisfy a uniform form
of impatience, the value of the market portfolio cannot grow unboundedly relative to
the aggregate endowment. This guarantees that the most optimistic present value of
claims in the remote future vanishes, which is the additional technical property needed
to establish Bulow and Rogoff (1989).4
Under Markov pricing, the conditions for the validity of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) can
be verified by means of a dominant root (Perron–Frobenius) approach. This requires
an extension to incomplete markets of the method for the characterization of dynamic
efficiency (most prominently, Aiyagari and Peled 1991). The dominant root estimates
the long-term interest rate, and the conditions for Bulow and Rogoff (1989) are satis-
fied when the long-term interest rate is positive net of growth. Incidentally, this ap-
proach is suitable to accommodate time-varying interest rate in traditional frameworks
for sovereign debt analysis (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz 1981).
Our paper is related to the work of Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) on self-enforcing
debt. Indeed, they also argue that sovereign debt is sustainable when the interest rate
is sufficiently low so as to provide repayment incentives. At a competitive equilibrium,
individuals are able to exactly refinance outstanding obligations by issuing new claims.
Hence, as debt can be rolled over, the sovereign has no incentive to default. In contrast,
in our examples, debt cannot be rolled over, as it is bounded by a finite natural debt
limit, and the sovereign prefers to repay the debt because default would be too costly in
terms of implied loss of insurance.
Pesendorfer (1992) studies repayment incentives of small open economies trading
with competitive risk-neutral foreign investors while having access to a limited set of
financial assets. His analysis differs from ours in a crucial aspect: the punishment in
4It is worth noticing that these restrictions on prices are exactly those that rule out speculative bubbles
on securities in positive net supply for any valuation of their fundamental value consistent with no arbitrage
opportunities (Santos and Woodford 1997).
1124 Bloise, Polemarchakis, and Vailakis Theoretical Economics 12 (2017)
Pesendorfer (1992) is that defaulters cannot hold a negative position in any of the avail-
able assets; we instead do allow defaulters to sell assets short, but only insofar as their
portfolio does not involve negative payoffs (future net obligations or net liabilities). Our
formulation is more in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989) cash-in-advance contract:
an up-front payment in exchange for positive contingent deliveries in the future. Im-
portantly, under Pesendorfer’s (1992) more severe punishment, sovereign debt could be
sustainable even when markets are complete.
A recent work of Auclert and Rognlie (2016) also extends Bulow and Rogoff (1989) to
incomplete markets. They only consider a risk-free bond and a constant, strictly pos-
itive interest rate, which permits a constructive proof of a replication policy upon de-
fault. Our analysis is more general, as we allow for time-varying interest rates and any
asset structure. However, due to our minimal assumptions, the replication strategy only
obtains abstractly by means of a duality argument. To this extent, the papers are com-
plementary.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the intuition for our anal-
ysis. In Section 3, we lay out the fundamentals of the economy. In Section 4, we discuss
the restrictions on the asset pricing kernel. In Section 5, we restore the validity of Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) under restrictions on prices. In Section 6, we present examples on
the failure of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) in incomplete markets. For completeness, we
gather some technical properties of incomplete markets pricing in Appendices A and D.
Furthermore, we present some relevant implications of competitive equilibrium in Ap-
pendix B. Finally, we develop the analysis under Markov pricing in Appendix C.
2. Illustrative case
We develop the intuition for unsustainable sovereign debt in a simple deterministic
economy. Our approach is different from the original argument in Bulow and Rogoff
(1989). This alternative method brings out the logic that underlies the incentives to de-
fault in a way that can then be immediately extended to uncertainty even under incom-
plete markets.
Time, t, is discrete, and the initial date is t = 0. The sovereign is entitled to an en-
dowment e = (    et   )  0, and consumes c = (    ct   ) ≥ 0. At any period t, the
sovereign’s preferences are given by an increasing (recursive) utility function. Following
Bulow and Rogoff (1989), monotonicity is the only restriction on preferences.
The sovereign has access to international capital markets, where, at any time t, it can
trade a one-period discount bond at price qt > 0. The flow budget constraint requires
that
pt+1vt+1 +pt(ct − et)≤ ptvt
where p = (   pt   )  0 is a sequence for present-value prices and v = (    vt   )
is the evolution of sovereign wealth. For notational convenience, we state the budget
constraint in terms of present-value prices, that is, by compounding interest rates over
time:
qt = pt+1
pt

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The sovereign holds vt+1 units of the one-period bond in period t, each delivering one
unit of consumption in the following period. This quantity is a claim if positive (because
the sovereign purchases the bond) and a liability if negative (because the sovereign sells
short the bond). We assume that vt < 0 in some period t, for otherwise no default incen-
tive would arise.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) assume that sovereign debt, −vt , never exceeds the market
value of a claim on the country’s future income stream, that is,
−vt ≤ gt = 1
pt
∑
r≥0
pt+ret+r 
Clearly, this is restrictive only if the claim has finite value or, according to the terminol-
ogy of Alvarez and Jermann (2000), only if the hypothesis of high implied interest rates
is satisfied. It is interesting to notice that when this limit is violated (that is, vt + gt < 0
in some period t), the country is necessarily running a Ponzi game. Indeed, the present
value of the future income stream evolves according to
pt+1gt+1 +ptet = ptgt 
Thus, consolidating with the budget constraint,
pt+1(vt+1 + gt+1)≤ pt(vt + gt)
This reveals that
lim inf
t
ptvt = lim
t
pt(vt + gt)= inf
t
pt(vt + gt)
where we use the fact that limt ptgt = 0 due to the hypothesis of high implied interest
rates. Hence,
lim inf
t
ptvt ≥ 0 if and only if inf
t
(vt + gt)≥ 0
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue that when the plan involves liabilities over time (that
is, vt < 0 in some period t), the country will have an incentive to default and to revert
to cash-in-advance contracts. These are budget-balanced plans involving no debt over
time, that is, in this simple deterministic economy, budget-balanced plans fulfilling an
additional no borrowing constraint. In this sense, reputational debt is unsustainable.
In general, a default incentive for the sovereign balances a benefit (no repayments
according to the previous debt obligations) with a cost (reduced trade opportunities,
due to the subsequent no borrowing constraint). The intuition of Bulow and Rogoff’s
(1989) paradox is instead grounded on a pure arbitrage principle: the sovereign is able
to replicate the previous consumption plan without borrowing and, hence, incurs no
substantial cost upon default. The crucial step is the construction of this replication
policy.
Define b= (    bt   ) as the sequence satisfying, at every t,
bt = sup
r≥0
1
pt
pt+r(−vt+r)
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In economic terms, bt is the minimum amount of resources that enables the sovereign
to pay back the debt in any arbitrary date beginning from t (investing this amount in
period t delivers (pt/pt+r)bt ≥ −vt+r after r periods). This value is finite since debt is
bounded by the present value of the country’s income stream. In particular, observing
that −vt+r ≤ gt+r at any future period,
−vt ≤ bt ≤ sup
r≥0
1
pt
pt+rgt+r ≤ gt
Furthermore, as debt in present value might be lower at future dates,
ptbt =max{−ptvtpt+1bt+1} (B)
Finally, notice that b0 > 0, as we assume that the country holds a debt in some period t.
The construction of this sort of envelope is illustrated by Figure 1: the drops in the
dashed line (ptbt ) reflect contractions in the future peaks of the dotted line (−ptvt ).
Condition (B) reveals that replication is feasible. Indeed, the alternative financial
plan w = v+ b≥ 0 satisfies the budget constraint with no liabilities, that is,
pt+1(vt+1 + bt+1)+pt(ct − et)≤ pt(vt + bt)
In other terms, at every point in time, bt is the minimum amount of resources that would
allow the sovereign to dispense with liabilities at no cost in terms of future trade oppor-
tunities. Furthermore, by condition (B), if the inequality is slack, i.e.,
pt+1bt+1 <ptbt
then wt = vt + bt = 0. This uncovers a strict benefit from defaulting and restart-
ing with wt = 0, because current consumption can be increased by the amount
ptbt −pt+1bt+1 > 0. In the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989), in this situation, sovereign
debt has reached its maximum expansion and, thus, the country begins a repayment
−ptvt
ptbtpresent value
period t
Figure 1. Envelope.
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policy. Defaulting allows the country to save on these repayments and enjoy higher
consumption.
For default not to be profitable, the sequence b must be rolling over exactly, that is,
pt+1bt+1 = ptbt
This implies that sovereign debt is recurrently at a peak over time (or the peak is never
reached) and, therefore, a real repayment policy never begins. No default incentive
emerges, but this contradicts the assumption that debt is bounded by the present value
of the future income stream. More precisely, in this case,
0<p0b0 = lim
t
ptbt ≤ lim
t
ptgt = 0
where the fact that limt ptgt = 0 is an implication of the hypothesis of high implied in-
terest rates.
We develop this line of reasoning so as to provide a proof under incomplete markets.
In particular, we construct an analogous envelope of future liabilities. Under incomplete
markets, however, valuation is ambiguous for streams that are not tradable in the mar-
ket and so is the construction of the envelope. We show that the process corresponding
to the most pessimistic (largest) valuation of future liabilities, when finite, is suitable
for the replication policy. To ensure that this is the case, we need the largest present
value of the country’s future income to be finite. This rules out any incentive to default,
but the sovereign might still be borrowing recurrently, as in the deterministic economy
discussed above. To eliminate this residual case, we need to slightly strengthen the hy-
pothesis on the pricing kernel: the optimistic valuation of future claims should vanish
in the remote future.
3. Fundamentals
3.1 Uncertainty
Trading occurs at each date-event in the set S along an infinite horizon. Time is indexed
by t in T = {012   }. We use the common notation st to denote one of the events in
S that may be reached in period t in T. Events in S are endowed with a partial ordering
, that is, whenever event st+r (st−r) in S succeeds (precedes) event st in S , we write
st+r  st (st  st−r). Thus, {st+1 ∈ S : st+1  st} is the finite set of immediate successors
of event st in S , whereas {st ∈ S : st+1  st} is the unique predecessor of event st+1 in S .
There is a unique initial event s0 in S . The set S , endowed with the partial order , is the
event tree.
The continuation tree at event st in S is S(st) = {st+r ∈ S : st+r  st}. A finite contin-
gent truncation F(st) of the continuation tree S(st) is a finite set of -unordered ele-
ments in S(st) such that any event in S(st) admits either a (weak) successor or a (weak)
predecessor in F(st). Figure 2 presents an example of a contingent truncation in a sim-
ple binomial tree: the continuation tree is initiated at the event corresponding to the
first solid circle, while a contingent truncation is identified by the thick circles.
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Figure 2. Contingent truncation.
3.2 Basic notation
Denote by L the linear space of all maps x : S →R. A map x in L is positive, x≥ 0, when
x(st) ≥ 0 for every event st in S ; nontrivially positive, x > 0, when positive and x(st) > 0
for some event st in S ; strictly positive, x 0, when x(st) > 0 for every event st in S . The
positive cone is L+ = {x ∈ L : x≥ 0}. For an element x on L, (x(st))st∈D is also regarded
as an element of the linear space L for any subset D of S , that is, as an element of L such
that x(st)= 0 at every event st not in the subset D of S .
3.3 Consumption and preferences
We let e be the element of L+ representing the sovereign’s endowment process of the sin-
gle commodity, where e(st) in R+ is the available value at event st in S . The sovereign’s
preferences on consumption plans c in L+ are defined by a contingent utility function
U : L+ → L, where U(c)(st) is the utility value beginning from event st in S . It is as-
sumed that U(cˆ)(st) > U(c˜)(st) whenever (cˆ(st+r))st+r∈S(st ) > (c˜(st+r))st+r∈S(st ). Strict
monotonicity is the only restriction on preferences.
3.4 Markets
To simplify notation, at no loss of generality, incomplete markets are represented by a
linear subspace V ofL such that v is in V if and only if (v(st+1))st+1st is also in V for every
st in S . In other terms, the space of tradable claims decomposes sequentially in a col-
lection of components for every event, each with deliveries only at subsequent events.
For a tradable claim v in V , we use the canonical decomposition v = v+ − v−, separating
claims v+ in L+ from liabilities v− in L+. These are interpreted as net positions, since
the portfolio composition is not explicit. We maintain the common assumption that
some strictly positive element u on L is also in V , that is, available financial instruments
allow for a (possibly risky) strictly positive transfer.5 The presence of a risk-free bond
would be sufficient to ensure this, though it is more demanding than necessary.
5This assumption is minimal. When all securities deliver positive payoffs, it fails only if no security can
be used to transfer resources at some subsequent event. This implies that these future markets are discon-
nected from the past.
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For a better understanding, as an example, consider the case where a finite set J of
securities is traded at every event st in S .6 Each security j in J is represented as a payoff
process Rj in L, interpreted as promises to deliver at successor nodes. A portfolio z in LJ
specifies holdings of available securities at all contingencies, with zj(st) in R being the
holding of security j in J at event st in S . In this case, the space of tradable contingent
claims V consists of all v in L such that, for some portfolio process z in LJ , at every event
st in S ,
(
v
(
st+1
))
st+1st =
(∑
j∈J
Rj
(
st+1
)
zj
(
st
))
st+1st

In other terms, each process v in V corresponds to the payoff of some trading plan z in
LJ . Notice that, in this notation, an elementary Arrow security at event st in S is a secu-
rity j in J with payoff Rj(sˆt+1)= 1 at a specific successor sˆt+1  st and payoff Rj(st+1)= 0
at any other successor st+1  st . A risk-free bond, instead, is a security j in J with con-
stant payoff Rj(st+1)= 1 at every successor st+1  st .
To maintain the analogy with complete markets, the market pricing of securities is
represented as an element ϕ on V .7 Thus, at every event st in S , the market value of any
portfolio with deliveries (v(st+1))st+1st in V is given by∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)

No arbitrage implies that whenever (v(st+1))st+1st in V is a (nontrivial) positive claim,
then its market value must be strictly positive. In other terms, any (nontrivially) positive
claim is costly on the market.
An implicit price p in P is a strictly positive element of L satisfying, for every tradable
claim v in V , at every event st in S ,
∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)= 1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)

By the assumption of no arbitrage, implicit prices exist and form a (nonempty) convex
cone P . Observe that only the ratios are relevant for the determination of such implicit
prices. This provides an equivalent representation of the asset pricing kernel. Indeed, as
prices are invariant on the space of tradable claims V , at every event st in S , the market
value of claims v in V is given by
inf
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)= sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)

6More generally, the set of traded securities might be varying over time, as for instance in Magill and
Quinzii (1994), Hernández and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996), and Santos and Woodford (1997).
Securities might be of any maturity and in positive (or even negative) net supply. All these features are
irrelevant for the budget restrictions, as assets are priced under no arbitrage conditions.
7This is at no loss of generality, as we assume that the law of one price is satisfied (see LeRoy and Werner
2014).
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Here we take these basic facts as a primitive framework. They are well established results
in the literature (see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii 1996, Santos and Woodford 1997,
and LeRoy and Werner 2014). To make the paper self-contained, the relevant theorems
are collected in Appendix D.
3.5 Natural debt limit
To disentangle incentives to default, we impose restrictions on borrowing that rule out
Ponzi schemes. In particular, as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989), and in line with a well
established tradition in the literature (see Aguiar and Amador 2014), we assume that
borrowing is bounded by a finite natural debt limit.
The natural debt limit is the maximum amount of debt that can be repaid in (al-
most) finite time out of the future endowment. As established by Hernández and Santos
(1996), Levine and Zame (1996), and Santos and Woodford (1997), when markets are in-
complete, this limit is determined as the worst valuation of future endowment. Thus,
sovereign debt is restricted at every event st in S by
v
(
st
)≥ − inf
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)

This solvency constraint guarantees the existence of a repayment policy in finite time
conditional on the set of available securities. Under limited commitment, however, the
sovereign might default on debt obligations even when a complete repayment is feasi-
ble.
In general, without any further assumptions on prices, the natural debt limit might
be infinite, because any debt can be repaid in finite time. In our analysis, we restrict
prices so as to rule out this situation, that is, we assume that
inf
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
is finite (E)
When individuals can commit, debt is only constrained by their repayment capacity and
the natural debt limit is necessarily finite, because otherwise unbounded debt would
prevent the existence of optimal plans (Santos and Woodford 1997, Proposition 2.3).
Under limited commitment, as shown by Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009) (see also Bidian
and Bejan 2015), repayment incentives might require low interest rates and, thus, con-
dition (E) might fail at a competitive equilibrium. Later on we illustrate some primitive
assumptions on fundamentals that imply a finite natural debt limit even under limited
commitment.
3.6 Self-enforcing contracts
A contract c in L+ is sustained by a financial plan v in V if, at every event st in S ,∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
v
(
st+1
)+ (c(st)− e(st))≤ v(st)
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Obviously, the budget constraint is vacuous when Ponzi games are not ruled out. Thus,
we say that a contract c in L+ is budget-feasible if it is sustained by a financial plan v in
V bounded by the finite natural debt limit.
The sovereign can default at any event. Upon default all securities remain available
subject to a no liability restriction. Thus, after default, financial plans w are restricted to
V ∩ L+. A budget-feasible contract c in L+ is immune to default if, at every event st in
S , for every alternative contract cˆ in L+ that is sustained by a restricted financial plan w
in V ∩ L+ with w(st) = 0, U(c)(st) ≥ U(cˆ)(st). In other terms, a contract is immune to
default whenever, at every date-event, a country would not benefit from defaulting and
trading subject to the no liability restriction thereafter.
For the understanding of default incentives, it is important to identify the role of
liabilities in providing insurance opportunities. To this purpose, we say that a contract
c in L+ is replicable whenever it is sustained by a financial plan w in V ∩ L+. When
a contract is not replicable, default involves the implicit cost of restricting insurance
opportunities. Notice that default might be profitable even though the contract is not
replicable, because the cost of restricted insurance opportunities is overwhelmed by the
gain from saved repayments.
4. High interest rates
4.1 Conditions on prices
We here present the condition under which we establish that sovereign debt is unsus-
tainable when markets are incomplete. This condition ensures that the government can
replicate the same consumption pattern after default. When it fails, debt might be sus-
tainable as the government might prefer to repay so as to preserve insurance opportuni-
ties. We provide examples of this under condition (E), that is, a finite natural debt limit
(see Section 6).
To extend Bulow and Rogoff (1989), we further restrict prices by assuming that
sup
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)
is finite (F)
That is, the value of the endowment is (uniformly) finite for all prices consistent with the
absence of arbitrage opportunities. In analogy with the terminology used in complete
markets (see Alvarez and Jermann 2000), we refer to this property as high implied interest
rates.
Under complete markets, high implied interest rates deliver the continuity of the
pricing kernel in a topology that is coherent with impatience: the value of residual
claims in the remote future vanishes. We need a similar property for Bulow and Rogoff
(1989) under incomplete markets, namely,
lim
t→∞ supp∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)= 0 (H)
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where S t contains all events in S at date t in T. When the pricing kernel satisfies condi-
tion (H), we say that it exhibits uniformly high implied interest rates.
We clarify the relationship among restrictions (E), (F), and (H) in Appendix A. These
conditions are all equivalent under complete markets, whereas they are progressively
more restrictive when markets are incomplete: condition (H) implies condition (F),
which in turn implies condition (E). In a nongrowing economy, condition (H) is sat-
isfied, for instance, when the (possibly time-varying) interest rate is uniformly positive.
Condition (F) fails when the risk-free bond is the only asset and the endowment obeys a
random-walk process, with sufficiently large variance, even if the interest rate is positive
and, hence, the natural debt limit is finite (that is, condition (E) holds true).
The nature of condition (H), as a reinforcement of condition (F), is rather technical:
it rules out prices attaching relatively high value to the remote future (see Appendix A).
In general, condition (F) does not imply condition (H) when markets are incomplete.
For a Markov pricing kernel, however, these conditions are equivalent (see Appendix C).
4.2 Competitive equilibrium
The hypothesis of uniformly high implied interest rates restricts prices and, hence, en-
dogenous variables. However, it can be derived from assumptions on fundamentals at
a competitive equilibrium under incomplete markets.8 To this purpose, it is relevant to
notice that the analysis of Santos and Woodford (1997) applies independently of the na-
ture of borrowing constraints, provided that these constraints do not induce mandatory
savings. Thus, in particular, debt can be restricted by endogenous limits preventing de-
fault, as in Zhang (1997), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009).
Though we do not pursue this line of research, some details of equilibrium implications
are presented in Appendix B.
Condition (F) is enforced when infinite-maturity securities in positive net supply
(such as Lucas trees) are traded in the market and their overall dividend is at least a
fraction of the aggregate endowment. The price of a security is necessarily finite at a
competitive equilibrium and, by no arbitrage, dominates its fundamental value, that is,
the present value of dividends for any consistent process of state prices (i.e., any p in P).
This imposes a uniform bound on the present value of dividends and so, as dividends
are at least a share of the endowment, on the present value of the endowment. Notice
that this implication holds true as far as the asset market is arbitrage-free.9
To ensure that condition (H) also holds true at a competitive equilibrium requires an
additional hypothesis on preferences. The purpose of this restriction is to avoid that the
market value of the aggregate portfolio grows unboundedly relative to the endowment.
At each contingency, impatience imposes a bound on the market value of securities, be-
cause individuals would otherwise profit by dismissing a small fraction of their portfo-
lio, increasing their current consumption by a large amount, and balancing their budget
8Competitive equilibrium under incomplete markets is studied, among others, by Magill and Quinzii
(1994), Hernández and Santos (1996), Levine and Zame (1996), and Santos and Woodford (1997).
9It is worth remarking that in an economy without outside assets, condition (F) might fail at a competi-
tive equilibrium even when borrowing is restricted by the natural debt limit and, hence, condition (E) holds
true.
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with a permanent small contraction of future consumption. When impatience is uni-
form across contingencies, this bound cannot grow over time relative to the aggregate
endowment, hence enforcing condition (H) in an economy where aggregate dividends
are at least a share of the endowment.
4.3 Verifiability
Verifying high implied interest rates, even under complete markets, is not straightfor-
ward when prices are not recursive. However, when the pricing is Markov (that is, prices
evolve according to a simple Markov process), the determination of high implied interest
rates simplifies considerably. In fact, we extend the dominant root (Perron–Frobenius)
approach (e.g., Aiyagari and Peled 1991) to incomplete markets. This analysis is devel-
oped in Appendix C.
We show that condition (F) holds true if and only if the dominant root is less than
unity. This root is related to the yield to maturity of a long-term discount bond (a sort
of long-term interest rate) and it does not exceed unity exactly when the long-term yield
is strictly positive. Furthermore, under Markov pricing, condition (H) is as restrictive as
condition (F) and, so, has no autonomous role.
Most of the literature on sovereign debt focuses on time-invariant interest rates with
risk-neutral pricing (see Aguiar and Amador 2014 and Wright 2012). Some recent quan-
titative work, however, points out that risk premia might be relevant for understand-
ing sovereign bond prices and that this requires consideration of non-risk-neutral pric-
ing kernels (see, for instance, Arellano 2008, Arellano and Ramanarayanan 2012, and
Hatchondo et al. 2016). Our analysis provides a simple condition to verify whether in-
terest rates are high in such frameworks.
5. Unsustainable debt
We here show that under uniformly high implied interest rates, sovereign debt is unsus-
tainable. This extends Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989) result (see also Martins-da-Rocha and
Vailakis forthcoming) under more restrictive assumptions than those for complete mar-
kets. Importantly, we provide an alternative argument that applies independently of the
extension to market incompleteness.
We show that under condition (F), the contract is replicable without debt (although,
in general, the replication policy can only be identified abstractly by means of a duality
argument). This implies that the default option is profitable unless the sovereign debt
is recurrently expanding over time in present value. This residual circumstance cannot
occur when condition (F) holds uniformly (i.e., under condition (H)), as it would other-
wise imply a Ponzi scheme. In complete markets, the uniformity follows by assumption
since prices have a sequential representation. In incomplete markets, a nonsequential
price, as the limit of admissible sequential prices, cannot be ruled out unless some uni-
formity of valuation is imposed on the pricing kernel (see Appendix A for a thorough
discussion). Importantly, when the pricing kernel is Markovian, the uniformity always
obtains under high implied interest rates (see Appendix C).
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Proposition 5.1 (Sovereign debt paradox). Under uniformly high implied interest
rates, a budget-feasible contract c in L+ is immune to default only if it involves no lia-
bilities. That is, any financial plan v in V sustaining this contract subject to the finite
natural debt limit must be positive.
The proof unfolds as in the deterministic case presented in Section 2. We first con-
struct an envelope process that captures the cost of servicing outstanding debt at any fu-
ture contingent truncation. The observation that, under uncertainty, truncations must
be contingent is essential for the whole argument, an issue that is absent in a determin-
istic environment. It ensures that the envelope process is not inflating over time and,
therefore, is a suitable candidate for replication. When this process is implemented by
available securities, it allows the government to default, save on the debt service, and re-
produce the same consumption pattern in the future without issuing further debt. How-
ever, with a general incomplete market structure, the envelope process might not lie in
the space of tradable claims. We overcome this issue by appealing to some basic results
for the transfer of resources under incomplete markets: the current cost of meeting a fu-
ture debt obligation, using available securities, can be computed as its largest valuation
at state prices consistent with no arbitrage opportunities. Thus, the envelope corre-
sponding to the largest valuation of future debt identifies a feasible replicating strategy.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Let g in L+ be given, at every event st in S , by
g
(
st
)= sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)

Consider a budget-feasible contract c in L+ that is sustained by a financial plan v in V
subject to the finite natural debt limit. Given an event st in S , define
b
(
st
)= sup
p∈P
sup
F(st )⊂S(st )
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+r∈F(st )
p
(
st+r
)(−v(st+r))≥ −v(st)
where F(st) is any finite contingent truncation of S(st) (for the definition, see Sec-
tion 3.1). Notice that, for fixed price p in P , given any contingent truncation F(st) of
S(st),
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+r∈F(st )
p
(
st+r
)(−v(st+r))≤ 1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+r∈F(st )
p
(
st+r
)
g
(
st+r
)≤ g(st)
where we use the fact that the process g in L+ dominates the natural debt limit and
satisfies the weak rollover condition
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
g
(
st+1
)+p(st)e(st)≤ p(st)g(st)
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Therefore, the process b in L obeys −v ≤ b ≤ g. Furthermore, the fact that truncations
are contingent implies that b in L fulfills the property
b
(
st
)=max{−v(st) sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)}

This happens because F(st) is a nontrivial finite contingent truncation of S(st) if and
only if
F(st)= ⋃
st+1st
F(st+1)
where F(st+1) is a finite contingent truncation of S(st+1) for every st+1  st in S .
By the theorem of duality (see Appendix D), there exists a tradable claim b∗ in V such
that, at every event st in S ,
b
(
st
)≤ b∗(st)
and ∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)
b∗
(
st+1
)= sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)

Therefore, at every event st in S ,
∑
st+1st
ϕ
(
st+1
)(
v
(
st+1
)+ b∗(st+1))+ (c(st)− e(st))
≤ sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)(
v
(
st+1
)+ b(st+1))+ (c(st)− e(st))
≤ (v(st)+ b(st))
≤ (v(st)+ b∗(st))
If there is an event st in S such that
b
(
st
)
> sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)

then v(st) + b(st) = 0. Define the process w in V ∩ L+ as w(st) = v(st) + b(st) = 0 and
w(st+r) = v(st+r) + b∗(st+r) ≥ 0 at any strict successor st+r in S(st). This sustains the
given consumption plan without exhausting the budget at the event st in S . That is, the
consumption plan c in L+ is not immune to default, a contradiction.
It follows that, at every event st in S , we must have
b
(
st
)= sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)

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The last condition implies that, for every arbitrary η > 0, there exists a price process p
in P such that, at every event st in S ,
b
(
st
)≤ 1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)+ηe(st)
Hence, recalling that b≤ g, we get
b
(
s0
) ≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st+1∈S t+1
p
(
st+1
)
b
(
st+1
)+η 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st−r∈S0t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)
≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st+1∈S t+1
p
(
st+1
)
g
(
st+1
)+η 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st−r∈S0t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)

where S t (respectively, S0t ) contains all events in S at date t in T (respectively, from the
initial date up to date t in T). Taking the limit, by uniformly high implied interest rates
(condition (H)), this implies that, for any arbitrary η> 0,
b
(
s0
)≤ η 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)

which shows that b(s0)≤ 0. Reproducing the argument beginning from any event proves
that b≤ 0 and, as v+ b≥ 0, v ≥ 0, thus establishing the claim. 
6. Examples
We here present some examples of the failure of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) under incom-
plete markets. The cause of this failure is that the incompleteness of markets does not
allow for replication when debt is prohibited after default. Differently from Hellwig and
Lorenzoni (2009), the valuation of future endowment is finite for some prices, i.e., con-
dition (E) is satisfied. However, condition (F) and, therefore, condition (H) are violated.
Notice that the failure of replication itself does not imply that the country cannot benefit
from default, because the cost might be compensated by the saving on debt repayments.
We prove that incentives to default do indeed disappear in the examples.
Example 6.1. The first example is simple but it delivers the basic intuition underlying
the failure of Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989) result. The economy is subject to binomial un-
certainty over states S = {lh} occurring with equal probability. The initial state is h in S.
To fix ideas, also assume that preferences over consumption are additively separable,
i.e.,
U(c)
(
s0
)= ∑
st∈S
βtμt
(
st
)
u
(
c
(
st
))

where u : R+ → R is a per-period utility function, 1 > β > 0 is the discount factor, and
μt(s
t) is the unconditional probability of event st in S . Here, as well as in the other
Theoretical Economics 12 (2017) Sovereign debt and incentives to default 1137
example, the set of date-events S consists of all partial histories of Markov states in S
having strictly positive probability, given a predefined initial Markov state in S.
Markets are incomplete. Indeed, at every event st in S , there is a single asset with
payoffs (RlRh) = (1−1) and price q(st) = 0. The endowment is (el eh) = (02). The
economy begins at state h in S with an inherited liability v(s0) = −1. Trivially, holding
one unit of the security permits complete insurance at constant consumption c(st) = 1
at every event st in S . However, whenever the economy is in state h in S, the country
holds a liability. We verify whether default is profitable in such contingencies.
Upon default, liabilities are not allowed. Hence, in this simple economy, no asset
can be traded and autarchy is the only budget-feasible consumption after default. In
general, defaulting may produce no benefit, thus violating Bulow and Rogoff’s (1989)
result. Indeed, a sufficient condition for this is that the instantaneous utility function
satisfies the inequality
(1−β)(u(2)− u(1))<β(u(1)− u(2)+ u(0)
2
)

That is, the sovereign cannot benefit from defaulting if the current gain of not repaying
the debt is compensated by the loss of smoothing future consumption. ♦
Remark 6.1. Observe that in this example, condition (F) and, hence, condition (H) are
violated while condition (E) is satisfied. Indeed, the present value of the endowment is
infinite (respectively, finite) for every implicit price process p∗ in P such that, at every
event st in S , p∗(st)= (1/2)tδt with δ > 1 (respectively, 0< δ< 1).
Example 6.2. The previous example does not satisfy one of our assumptions because
markets do not permit a strictly positive transfer. We here develop a more complicated
example under this additional restriction. Uncertainty is given by Markov states S =
{lmh}, all occurring with the same probability. The economy begins in state h in S.
As in the previous example, preferences are assumed to be additively separable with
a per-period utility function of the form
u(c)= c
1−(1/γ) − 1
1− (1/γ) 
where γ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Notice that, for any γ in the
interval (01/2), this utility function is uniformly bounded from above, as
u(c)≤ −1
1− (1/γ) ≤ 1 (*)
Furthermore, as can be verified by direct computation, for every 1>η> 0,
lim
γ→0
u(1−η)= lim
γ→0
(1−η)1−(1/γ) − 1
1− (1/γ) = −∞ (**)
The important implication is that any small drop in consumption induces an arbitrarily
large loss in utility when γ > 0 is sufficiently small.
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At every event st in S , there are only two securities paying off (RlRmRh)= (1 	0)
and (RlRmRh) = (0 	1), for some sufficiently small 1 > 	 > 0. The price of each se-
curity is q = (1/3)β(1 + 	), where 1 > β > 0 is the discount factor. The endowment is
(el emeh) = (012). Notice that strictly positive holdings of both securities permit a
strictly positive transfer, as long as 	 > 0, thus satisfying our general assumptions.
Notice that a balanced portfolio delivers (vl vmvh) = (10−1). This sustains full
insurance with constant consumption c(st) = 1 at every event st in S . Furthermore, it
is optimal for all sufficiently large bounded debt limits. Does the country benefit from
defaulting when holding a liability (and, hence, at the initial event s0 in S when the econ-
omy is in state h in S)?
Preliminarily notice that, at every event st in S , by budget feasibility without liabili-
ties, consumption is bounded by a process ξ in L+ such that, at every event st in S ,
ξ
(
st+1
)≥ 1
q
ξ
(
st
)+ e(st+1)
for some sufficiently large initial value ξ(s0) in R+. Such bounds overestimate the pay-
offs of available assets (because 1 > 	 > 0). Moreover, they hold true independently of
any sufficiently small 	 > 0. We assume that the following inequality is satisfied:
q
	
>
1
3
β
	
> 1 (†)
Under this condition, we evaluate default incentives along a sequence of monotonically
vanishing γ > 0.
Suppose that there exists a sequence of consumption plans (cγ)γ>0 such that each
plan is supported by a trading strategy involving no liabilities and guarantees an overall
utility after defaulting at least equal to the overall utility from full insurance. That is,
given any γ > 0, assume that
U
(
cγ
)(
s0
)≥U(c)(s0)= 0
With no loss of generality, it can be assumed that the sequence of consumption plans
converges, that is, at every event st in S , c0(st)= limγ→0 cγ(st)≤ ξ(st). We first argue that
this limit guarantees at least the full-insurance consumption.
To verify this, assume that, at some event st in S , c0(st) < 1−η for some 1>η> 0. By
condition (**), this implies an infinite loss, which cannot be compensated by bounded
gains in other periods, because of (*). Hence, at every event st in S , the consumption in
the limit exceeds the full-insurance consumption, that is, c0(st) ≥ 1. We now argue by
contradiction.
The example is constructed in such a way that, as long as the economy remains in
state m in S, the net return on securities is negative (by condition (†), because the price
of the security is q, while its payoff is 	). Hence, it is costly to roll over resources so as to
provide insurance when the averse state l in S occurs again. Indeed, consider an event
st in S in which the economy is in state m in S. Suppose that the economy remains in
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state m in S for r in N consecutive dates and, after this phase, enters the averse state l in
S. This happens at the event st+r in S . A direct computation yields
c0
(
st+r
)≤ ( 1
q
)(
	
q
)r−1
ξ
(
st
)

For the computation of this bound, we use the fact that, in the limit as γ > 0 vanishes,
the endowment is completely consumed in state m in S. Initial resources are rolled over
so as to overestimate their contribution to consumption when the economy enters in
state l in S. For a sufficiently large r in N, by condition (†), full-insurance consumption
cannot be guaranteed. ♦
Remark 6.2. We can verify that, for Example 6.2, condition (F) and, hence, condition
(H) are violated, while condition (E) is satisfied. Indeed, as the economy is stationary,
state prices (πlπmπh) in RS+ are only restricted by the pricing equations
πh + 	πm = q= 13β(1+ 	) and πl + 	πm = q=
1
3
β(1+ 	)
State prices correspond to the ratios of implicit present value prices in our general anal-
ysis. For any choice of (stationary) state prices π in RS+, the present value of the endow-
ment, if finite, is determined by the system of equations
gl(π) = el +πlgl(π)+πmgm(π)+πhgh(π)
gm(π) = em +πlgl(π)+πmgm(π)+πhgh(π)
gh(π) = eh +πlgl(π)+πmgm(π)+πhgh(π)
We now argue that the value is finite for some state prices and infinite for other state
prices.
Setting πh = πl = 0, we obtain πm = (q/	). For these state prices, the present value
of the endowment satisfies
gm(π)= em +πlgl(π)+πmgm(π)+πhgh(π)≥ em + q
	
gm(π)
No positive solution exists whenever 	 > 0 fulfills condition (†) in Example 6.2, thus
showing that condition (F) and, hence, condition (H) are violated.
To show that condition (E) holds true, it suffices to exhibit alternative state prices π
in RS+ for which the value of the endowment is finite. For instance, setting πh = πm =
πl = (1/3)β, a positive solution exists and is bounded by the value of receiving surely the
largest endowment forever, eh/(1−β).
7. Conclusion
We have shown, by means of examples, that market incompleteness may induce incen-
tives for repayment when liabilities are prohibited after default. A sovereign may not
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benefit from defaulting on its debt and positive borrowing can be sustainable by reputa-
tion. But the Bulow and Rogoff (1989) result does extend to economies with uninsurable
risks if the pricing functional satisfies stronger restrictions. In particular, repayment in-
centives disappear when the value of the most optimistic valuation of future endowment
eventually vanishes in the long run.
Appendix A: Restrictions on prices
This is a rather technical appendix that clarifies the nature of the different hypotheses
on prices. We begin with showing that, as the terminology suggests, uniformly high
implied interest rates (condition (H)) are more demanding than simply high implied
interest rates (condition (F)).
Proposition A.1 (High interest rates). Condition (H) implies condition (F).
Proof. Indeed, assuming that (F) is violated, we can show that, for any 	 > 0, at every
date t in T,
sup
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)≥ 	
thus violating restriction (H). To this purpose, it suffices to argue that, for every t in T,
sup
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st−r∈S0t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)
is finite
where S0t contains all contingencies in S from the initial date up to date t in T. This
is what we accomplish below, by exploiting that some strictly positive claim u is in the
tradable space V .
Fixing any t in T, suppose that (w(st+1))st+1∈S t+1 is a tradable claim in V ∩ L+. It is
immediate to verify that there exists a tradable claim (w(st))st∈S t in V ∩L+ such that, for
every price p in P , at every event st in S t ,
∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)
w
(
st+1
)+p(st)e(st)≤ p(st)w(st)
This is true because, for some sufficiently large λ > 0, the expansion λ(u(st))st∈S t is an
arbitrarily large strictly positive tradable claim in V ∩L+, where u is the strictly positive
claim in V . Therefore, by backward induction, beginning with (w(st+1))st+1∈S t+1 = 0,
there exists a sufficiently large w(s0) in R+ such that, for every p in P ,∑
st−r∈S0t
p
(
st−r
)
e
(
st−r
)≤ p(s0)w(s0)
thus proving the claim. 
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We now present an example in which condition (H) is certainly satisfied: when the
interest rate is uniformly positive in an economy with bounded endowment. We also
provide an example in which condition (H) fails when the natural debt limit is finite,
that is, condition (E) holds true. This happens when the endowment evolves according
to a random walk, the risk-free bond is the only asset, and the interest rate is constant,
provided that the variance of the endowment is sufficiently large.
Example A.1. Consider an economy with bounded endowment and a tradable risk-free
bond yielding unitary payoff. The pricing kernel is assumed to satisfy, for some suffi-
ciently large 1>β> 0, at every event st in S ,
β≥ sup
p∈P
1
p
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p
(
st+1
)

As the right-hand side is the price of the bond, this restriction imposes a sort of lower
bound on the interest rates uniformly across all contingencies. When this uniform lower
bound exists, the hypothesis of uniformly high implied interest rates is satisfied. Indeed,
given any price p in P , at every t in T, it follows that
β
∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)≥ ∑
st+1∈S t+1
p
(
st+1
)

where S t contains all events in S at date t in T. Therefore, at every t in T,
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)≤ η βt
1−β
where η> 0 is such that e(st)≤ η for every st in S . ♦
Example A.2. Consider an economy in which the endowment process evolves as a ran-
dom walk, that is, at every event st in S ,
e
(
st
)= ∑
st+1st
μt+1
(
st+1|st)e(st+1)
whereμt+1(st+1|st) is the probability conditional on the event st in S . There is only a risk-
free bond (with unitary deliveries) having a price that is constantly equal to 1>β> 0 at
all contingencies. We further assume that the conditional variance of the endowment
process satisfies
1≤ β
∑
st+1st
μt+1
(
st+1|st)(e
(
st+1
)
e
(
st
) )2
In such an environment, we verify that condition (E) holds true, while condition (F) fails.
To verify condition (E), notice that a particular price p in P is given by p(st) =
βtμt(s
t) at every event st in S , where μt(st) is the unconditional probability of event
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st in S . By the random walk property of the endowment, its present value is finite at this
price, that is, ∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e
(
st
)= ∑
st∈S
βtμt
(
st
)
e
(
st
)= ( 1
1−β
)
e
(
s0
)

To uncover the violation of condition (F), notice that another particular price p∗ in P
is given by p∗(st) = βtμt(st)e(st) at every event st in S . Indeed, observe that, by the
random-walk hypothesis for the endowment,
1
p∗
(
st
) ∑
st+1st
p∗
(
st+1
)= β
Given any event st in S , simple computations deliver
p∗
(
st
)
e
(
st
)≤ ∑
st+1st
p∗
(
st+1
)
e
(
st+1
)

where we have exploited the hypothesis on the conditional variance of the endowment
process. Thus, high implied interest rates (condition (F)) are violated, as there is a price
p∗ in P such that the value of the endowment is inflating over time. ♦
To conclude, we provide a characterization of uniformly high implied interest rates.
The violation of uniformly high implied interest rates occurs if and only if some price
in the closure of admissible prices contains a bubble, that is, a nonnegligible value at
infinity. Under complete markets, such a circumstance is ruled out by assumption, as
prices have a sequential representation. When markets are incomplete, a nonsequential
price—as the limit of admissible prices—cannot be ruled out, unless some uniformity
of valuation is imposed on the pricing kernel. As a complement to this characterization,
we provide an example in which condition (F) is satisfied and condition (H) is violated.
Consider the linear space
L(e)= {x ∈L : |x| ≤ λe for some λ > 0}
which is a Banach lattice when endowed with the norm ‖x‖ = inf{λ > 0 : |x| ≤ λe}. As
usual, let L∗(e) be its norm dual. Notice that, by Alaoglu’s theorem (Aliprantis and Bor-
der 2006, Theorem 6.21), the closed unit ball in L∗(e) is weak-∗ compact.
Under high implied interest rates, the space of (normalized) state prices,
P0 =
{
p ∈ P : p(s0)= 1}
can be regarded as a set in the positive cone of L∗(e), where the duality operation is
given by
p(x)=
∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
x
(
st
)

Notice that, in general, the set P0 is not weak-∗ closed in L∗(e), though, by Alaoglu’s
theorem, it is contained in a weak-∗ compact set.
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Proposition A.2 (Value at infinity). Under high implied interest rates, the condition of
uniformly high implied interest rates is satisfied if and only if, for every p in the weak-∗
closure of P0 in L∗(e),
lim
t∈Tp
(
et
)= p(e)
where et in L is the truncation of e in L at date t in T.
Proof. For necessity, suppose that the equivalent condition is violated. By positivity,
this means that there exists 	 > 0 such that, for some p∗ in the weak-∗ closure of P0, at
every t in T,
p∗
(
e− et)= p∗(e)−p∗(et)> 	
As p∗ lies in the weak-∗ closure of P0, for every t in T, it can be approximated by some p
in P0 such that
p
(
e− et)> 	
Thus, for every t in T,
sup
p∈P0
p
(
e− et)> 	
which contradicts the fact that condition (H) is satisfied.
For sufficiency, suppose that the equivalent condition is satisfied and assume a vio-
lation of uniformly high implied interest rates. By monotonicity, this implies that there
exists 	 > 0 such that, for every t in T,
sup
p∈P0
p
(
e− et)≥ 	
At every t in T, consider the restricted set
P¯0t =
{
p ∈ P¯0 : p
(
e− et)≥ 	}
where P¯0 is the weak-∗ closure of P0 in the positive cone of L∗(e). Observe that P¯0t is a
nonempty closed subset of the compact set P¯0 and that, by monotonicity, P¯0t+1 ⊂ P¯0t .
By the finite intersection property, as P¯0 is compact, there exists p∗ such that
p∗ ∈
⋂
t∈T
P¯0t ⊂ P¯0
For such an element p∗ of P¯0, p∗(e) ≥ p∗(et)+ 	 for every t in T, thus delivering a con-
tradiction. 
Example A.3. The Markov states are S = {(lt)t∈T (ht)t∈T}, with l0 being the initial state
and each ht being an absorbing state. In period t in T, when the economy is in state
lt , with equal probability, it will move to the absorbing state ht+1 or to state lt+1. The
endowment is e = (1 − β) in state lt and e = β−t (1 − β) in state ht . The only asset is a
noncontingent bond, delivering a unitary payoff, with constant price 1>β> 0.
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To verify that condition (F) holds true, notice that the most optimistic valuation of
the endowment satisfies the recursive equation
g(lt)= (1−β)+ sup
(πlπh)∈R+×R+
πlg(lt+1)+πhg(ht+1)
subject to
πl +πh = β
Furthermore, by direct computation, g(ht)= β−t . It is also immediate to prove that this
recursive equation is solved by
g(lt)= 1+β−t 
We now argue that condition (H) is instead violated.
For fixed noninitial t in T, consider the following feasible sequence of Markov states
in S:
(l0     lt−1htht   )
Let D be the path of date-events in S corresponding to the selected sequence of Markov
states and construct a price p in the closure of P by means of p(stˆ)= βtˆ if stˆ lies in D and
p(stˆ)= 0 otherwise. For such a price p in P , direct computation shows that
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
)=∑
r∈T
βt+rβ−t (1−β)= 1
Thus, the residual does not vanish, which shows that condition (H) cannot be satisfied.♦
Appendix B: Competitive equilibrium
We here show that, at a competitive equilibrium, condition (H) is necessarily enforced
under some assumptions on fundamentals. More precisely, we consider an infinite-
horizon economy with sequentially incomplete markets as in Santos and Woodford
(1997). Their framework is particularly suitable for our analysis because they do not
introduce any specific hypothesis on the nature of debt limits (apart from ruling out
mandatory savings). For the sake of completeness, we illustrate how to adapt their ar-
guments to our purposes.
For each individual i in a finite set I, the budget constraint at event st in S takes the
form
q
(
st
) · zi(st)+ (ci(st)− ei(st))≤ vi(st)
where the evolution of wealth is given by
vi
(
st+1
)=R(st+1) · zi(st)
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Here the process zi inLJ describes the portfolio of securities (in a finite set J), with prices
q in LJ , and the process R in LJ represents their (one-period) payoffs. Market clearing
for securities requires, at every event st in S ,∑
i∈I
zi
(
st
)= z¯(st)= z¯(s0)
where the constant process z¯ in LJ captures the net supply of securities. Market clearing
for consumption, at every event st in S , takes the form∑
i∈I
ci
(
st
)=∑
i∈I
ei
(
st
)+ y¯(st)= e¯(st)
where y¯ in L+ is the aggregate dividend of securities and e¯ in L+ is the aggregate over-
all endowment. We assume that the aggregate dividend is delivered by some infinite-
maturity securities in positive net supply (i.e., such that z¯j(s0) > 0). In addition, no se-
curity is in negative net supply (i.e., z¯j(s0)≥ 0 for every j in J).
We now describe the assumptions on fundamentals that are crucial for uniformly
high implied interest rates at a competitive equilibrium. These restrictions are intro-
duced and discussed in Santos and Woodford (1997) (as well as in Levine and Zame 1996
and Magill and Quinzii 1994). For brevity, and to simplify notation, we only present the
derived implications that are essential for our condition (H).
First, we assume that the aggregate dividend is at least a fraction of the aggregate
endowment, that is, for some sufficiently small 	 > 0, at every event st in S ,
	e¯
(
st
)≤ y¯(st) (*)
In the terminology of Santos and Woodford (1997), this is the hypothesis that the ag-
gregate endowment is bounded by a trading portfolio (in positive net supply). This re-
striction on fundamentals necessarily implies condition (F) at a competitive equilib-
rium (Santos and Woodford 1997, Lemma 2.4): the market value of securities bounds
the present value of dividends (the fundamental value) for all prices consistent with no
arbitrage; as the aggregate endowment is at least a fraction of the aggregate dividend, its
present value is also finite for all prices.
Second, we assume that preferences satisfy uniform impatience as in Santos and
Woodford (1997) (see also Levine and Zame 1996 and Magill and Quinzii 1994). This
imposes a uniform bound on the rate of substitution between current and permanent
future consumption. The hypothesis is more restrictive than simply impatience, though
it is satisfied by additively separable (bounded) utility functions with constant discount-
ing. We refer to Santos and Woodford (1997) (Assumption A.3 and the discussion there-
after) for a precise definition and only illustrate its relevant implication at a competitive
equilibrium.
Santos and Woodford (1997) ((6.17) in the proof of Lemma 3.8) show that, for every
individual i in I, at every event st in S ,
(1− γ)q(st) · zi(st)≤ e¯(st) (**)
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where 1> γ > 1 is given by the hypothesis of uniform impatience. This restriction holds
true because otherwise the individual would benefit from an expansion of current con-
sumption balanced by a permanent γ contraction of future consumption, thus contra-
dicting optimality.
We now expand the analysis in Santos and Woodford (1997) so as to derive our con-
dition (H) under the stated primitive assumptions. Adding across individuals, and using
market clearing, condition (**) implies, at every event st in S ,(
1− γ
#I
)
q
(
st
) · z¯(s0)≤ e¯(st) (†)
where #I in N is the number of individuals. For any price p in P , the fundamental value
is bounded by the market value of the security (Santos and Woodford 1997, Proposi-
tion 2.1). Thus, by (†),(
1− γ
#I
) ∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
y¯
(
st+r
)≤ p(st)e¯(st)
and using condition (*),
	
(
1− γ
#I
) ∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e¯
(
st+r
)≤ p(st)e¯(st)
Therefore, for some sufficiently small η> 0, for every price p in P , at every event st in S ,
η
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e¯
(
st+r
)≤ p(st)e¯(st) (††)
Fixing a period t in T, we add up terms in inequality (††) so as to obtain
(t + 1)η
∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e¯
(
st+r
)≤ ∑
st−r∈S0t
p
(
st−r
)
e¯
(
st−r
)

where S t (respectively, S0t ) contains all events at period t in T (respectively, from the
initial period up to period t in T). In computing the series on the left-hand side, we
drop all positive terms corresponding to date-events occurring before period t in T. The
above implies
sup
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈St
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e¯
(
st+r
)≤ 1
η
(
1
t + 1
)
sup
p∈P
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S
p
(
st
)
e¯
(
st
)

As condition (F) is satisfied, the right-hand side vanishes in the limit, so proving that
condition (H) holds true.
Appendix C: Markov pricing
We here consider a Markov economy with finite state space. When the pricing kernel
is Markovian, we provide a complete characterization of uniformly high implied in-
terest rates (i.e., condition (H)). We accomplish this by extending the dominant root
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(Perron–Frobenius) approach to incomplete markets (see Aiyagari and Peled 1991 for a
well established economic application to complete markets). This analysis can be of in-
dependent interest, as a way to introduce time-varying interest rates in widely adopted
frameworks (e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz 1981).
Fundamentals are governed by a Markov process on the finite state space S, with
strictly positive transition probabilities. We assume that the endowment satisfies
e(s) > 0 for every state s in S. Markov state prices π in RS×S are represented as a ma-
trix, with π(s s′) ≥ 0 being the implicit price in state s in S of one unit of consumption
to be delivered in state s′ in S. As markets are incomplete (and a strictly positive claim
is tradable), there is a compact set ⊂RS×S of such state prices. Under these premises,
condition (F) amounts to verify the existence of a positive solution to the system of
equations, for every s in S,
g(s)= e(s)+(g)(s) (M)
where, with some abuse of notation,
(g)(s)= sup
π∈
∑
s′∈S
π
(
s s′
)
g
(
s′
)

Notice that, by no arbitrage (as far as all states can be reached with strictly positive prob-
ability), for every g in RS+, at every state s in S,
(g)(s)= 0 only if g = 0 (*)
This is a sort of indecomposability property.
The pricing kernel  is a sublinear operator, that is, it is subadditive, (g′ + g′′) ≤
(g′)+(g′′), and positive homogeneous, (λg)= λ(g) for every λ in R+. This is the
relevant implication of market incompleteness. To deal with this case, we provide an
extension of Perron–Frobenius theorem to sublinear (rather than linear) operators.
The dominant root ρ() of the pricing kernel  is defined as the (strictly positive)
eigenvalue such that, for some (nonzero) eigenvector d in RS+,
ρ()d =(d)
Notice that, necessarily, this eigenvector is strictly positive, i.e., d(s) > 0 for every s
in S, because of property (*). The dominant root exists by an adaptation of the Perron–
Frobenius theorem to sublinear operators.
Proposition C.1 (Dominant root). A unique dominant root ρ() of the pricing kernel
 exists.
Proof. Consider the canonical unitary simplex= {d ∈RS+ :
∑
s∈S d(s)= 1} and endow
R
S with the norm ‖d‖1 = ∑s∈S |d(s)|. An eigenvector d in  is the fixed point of the
continuous map
d → (d)∥∥(d)∥∥1 
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with the associated eigenvalue being ρ() = ‖(d)‖1. It exists by the Brouwer fixed
point theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Corollary 17.56). To verify that the domi-
nant root is unique, suppose that ρ′ > 0 and ρ′′ > 0 are both dominant roots with ρ′ > ρ′′.
As corresponding eigenvectors are strictly positive, consider the largest λ > 0 such that
λd′ ≤ d′′ and, at no loss of generality, assume that λ= 1. Hence, by monotonicity,
ρ′d′ ≤(d′)≤(d′′)≤ ρ′′d′′
a contradiction because ρ′ > ρ′′. 
Remark C.1. An interesting interpretation of the dominant root is related to the yield
to maturity of long-term discount bonds, or the long-term interest rate. Indeed, assume
that safe bonds of any maturity are traded in every state s in S. The yield to maturity of a
one-period discount bond issued in state s in S is given by
r1(s)= 1
(1)(s)
− 1
Analogously, given any n in N, the yield to maturity of an n-period discount bond issued
in state s in S can be computed as
rn(s)= 1n√n(1)(s) − 1
Notice that, by monotonicity, for every state s in S,
λ∗ρ()nd(s)≤n(1)(s)≤ λ∗ρ()nd(s)
where d in RS+ is an eigenvector associated with the dominant root, λ∗ > 0 and λ∗ > 0
are chosen so as to satisfy λ∗d ≤ 1≤ λ∗d. Hence,
ρ() n
√
λ∗d(s)≤ n
√
n(1)(s)≤ ρ() n
√
λ∗d(s)
It follows that the dominant root corresponds to the long-term yield to maturity, or long-
term interest rate, that is, for every s in S,
lim
n→∞ rn(s)= limn→∞
1
n
√
n(1)(s)
− 1= 1
ρ()
− 1
Remark C.2. It is worth noticing that the dominant root can be less than unity even
when the interest rate is negative in some state of nature. To verify this, consider the
following example. Markets are complete and, hence, there are unique state prices π in
R
S×S . These state prices are given by
(
π11 π12
π21 π22
)
=
⎛
⎜⎝
1
4
7
4
1
28
7
28
⎞
⎟⎠ 
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The price of the safe bond in the first state is π11 + π12 = 2, thus implying a negative
interest rate. However, the dominant root is ρ() = 1/2, with associated eigenvector
(d1 d2)= (11/7).
Proposition C.2 (High implied interest rates). A solution g in RS+ to equations (M) ex-
ists if and only if ρ() < 1.
Proof. Arguing by contradiction, suppose that ρ()≥ 1 and that, for some g in RS+,
g = e+(g)
Choose λ ≥ 0 as the largest value satisfying g ≥ λd, where d in RS+ is an eigenvector
associated with the dominant root. Also, e ≥ 	d for some sufficiently small 	 > 0. By
monotonicity,
g ≥ e+(λd)≥ 	d +(λd)≥ (	+ ρ()λ)d ≥ (	+ λ)d
a contradiction. To prove the reverse implication, consider the operator T : RS+ → RS+
given by
T(g)= e+(g)
Endow the linear space RS with the (equivalent) norm
∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥= inf{λ≥ 0 : ∣∣g′ − g′′∣∣≤ λd}
Monotone sublinearity implies
T
(
g′′
)≤ T (g′ + ∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥d)≤ T (g′)+ ρ()∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥d
and
T
(
g′
)≤ T (g′′ + ∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥d)≤ T (g′′)+ ρ()∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥d
Thus, ∥∥T (g′)− T (g′′)∥∥≤ ρ()∥∥g′ − g′′∥∥
The contraction mapping theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 3.51) guaran-
tees existence and uniqueness of the solution to equations (M). 
As condition (F) is satisfied if and only if the system of equations (M) admits a
positive solution, the above Proposition C.2 provides a complete characterization in a
Markov setting. We now turn to condition (H) and show that, under Markovian pricing,
it is not more restrictive than condition (F).
Proposition C.3 (Characterization). Condition (H) is satisfied if and only if ρ() < 1.
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Proof. We only have to verify that condition (H) is satisfied when ρ() < 1. Notice that,
for every price p in P , at every event st in S , there is π in  such that
p
(
st+1
)= π(st st+1)p(st)
where we use the fact that a date-event is a sequence of Markov states, that is, st =
(s0 s1     st) in St+1. Assuming that g ≤ d with no loss of generality, for every t in T,
given a price p in P ,
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
∑
st+r∈S(st )
p
(
st+r
)
e
(
st+r
) ≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)
g(st)
≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)
d(st)
≤ ρ()td(s0)
To verify the upper bound in the extreme right-hand side, just argue by induction.
Clearly, g(s0)≤ d(s0). Furthermore, at every t in T,
1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st+1∈S t+1
p
(
st+1
)
d(st+1) ≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)( ∑
st+1∈S
π(st st+1)d(st+1)
)
≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)
(d)(st)
≤ 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)
ρ()d(st)
≤ ρ() 1
p
(
s0
) ∑
st∈S t
p
(
st
)
d(st)
This proves the claim as ρ() < 1. 
Appendix D: Arbitrage-free pricing
We here collect some basic facts about arbitrage-free asset pricing that are used in the
body of the text. These are well known implications of duality. We provide simple proofs
for convenience, independently of their applications in this paper.
The space of tradable claims Y is a linear subspace of some (finite-dimensional)
linear space X , endowed with its canonical ordering. The pricing of tradable claims is
given by a linear map ϕ : Y → R. This map is arbitrage-free, in the sense that, for any
claim y in Y , y > 0 only if ϕ(y) > 0. We assume that there exists a strictly positive tradable
claim u in Y with ϕ(u)= 1. This need not be the safe asset, though a safe asset would be
sufficient for this property to be satisfied. The internal product on X is denoted by x · y.
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Let  be the convex set of positive linear functionals π in X such that, for every y
in Y ,
ϕ(y)= π · y
Here is the fundamental theorem of finance.
Fundamental Theorem of Finance. The set is compact and contains a strictly pos-
itive linear functional π onX .
Proof. Notice that the convex set K = {x ∈ X+ : x · u = 1} does not intersect the linear
subspace Z = {y ∈ Y : ϕ(y) = 0}. By the strong separation theorem (Aliprantis and Bor-
der 2006, Theorem 5.58), there exists a nonnull π in X such that, for every k in K and for
every z in Z,
π · k> π · z
As Z is a linear space, π ·z = 0 for every z in Z. If π ·x≤ 0 for some nonnull x in X+, then
0≥ 1
x · uπ · x≥ π ·
(
1
x · ux
)
> 0
a contradiction. Hence, π is a strictly positive positive linear functional on X . We next
show that π is in .
With no loss of generality, it can be assumed that π · y¯ = ϕ(y¯) > 0 for some y¯ in Y .
Given any y in Y , suppose that ϕ(y) > π · y. Hence,
ϕ
(
y − ϕ(y)
ϕ(y¯)
y¯
)
= 0 and π ·
(
y − ϕ(y)
ϕ(y¯)
y¯
)
< 0
a contradiction. The set  is compact as it is contained in {π ∈X+ : π · u= ϕ(u)}. 
When markets are incomplete,  contains multiple value kernels. Nevertheless, val-
ues are restricted by upper and lower bounds.
Theorem of Duality. For every x inX ,
max
π∈
π · x=min
y∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : x≤ y}
and
min
π∈
π · x=max
y∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : y ≤ x}
Proof. We prove the first statement only, as the argument is specular for the other
statement. We first show that there exists y¯ in Y such that x≤ y¯ and
ϕ(y¯)=min
y∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : x≤ y}
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Observe that, for some sufficiently large λ > 0,
−λu≤ x≤ λu
where u is the strictly positive claim in Y . Thus, by no arbitrage,
−λϕ(u)≤ inf
y∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : x≤ y}≤ λϕ(u)
This shows that the infimum is finite. For every n in N, there exists a claim yn in {y ∈
Y : x≤ y} such that
ϕ
(
yn
)≤ inf
y∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : x≤ y}+ 1
n

If the sequence (yn)n∈N is bounded, then the claim follows. Otherwise, observe that
yˆn = yn/‖yn‖ is also a tradable claim in Y satisfying
x∥∥yn∥∥ ≤ yˆn
and
ϕ
(
yˆn
)≤ infy∈Y
{
ϕ(y) : x≤ y}∥∥yn∥∥ + 1n∥∥yn∥∥ 
Taking a subsequence of (yˆn)n∈N in Y converging to yˆ in Y , we obtain that yˆ > 0 and
ϕ(yˆ)≤ 0, contradicting no arbitrage.
Clearly, π · (x − y¯) ≤ 0 for every π in . To prove that the opposite inequality is
satisfied by some π in , consider the convex set C in R×X defined by{(
ϕ(y¯ − y) y − x) ∈R×X : y ∈ Y}
This set does not intersect R+ × X++. Hence, by the separating hyperplane theorem,
there exists a nonnull (μπ) in R+ ×X+ such that, for every y in Y ,
μϕ(y¯ − y)≤ π · (x− y)
It can be verified that μ> 0 and, hence, μ= 1 with no loss of generality. Also,
0≤ ϕ(y¯ − y¯)≤ π · (x− y¯)≤ 0
thus proving that π · (x− y¯)= 0. Finally, notice that when y lies in Y , also (y¯ − y) is in Y .
It follows that
ϕ(y)≤ ϕ(y¯ − (y¯ − y))≤ π · (x− (y¯ − y))≤ π · y
As Y is a linear space, it is also true that ϕ(−y)≤ π · (−y). We conclude that, for every y
in Y ,
ϕ(y)= π · y
which reveals that π is an element of . 
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